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Introduction
Disclosure of environmental information is an increasingly popular instrument of regulation throughout the world. Recent studies (e.g. Managi, 2011, 2010; Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson, 2008) have started to analyze the impact of Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) outside the US, its country of origin. The idea to use information disclosure as a regulatory approach stems from the Anglo-Saxon political tradition of the freedom of information. With the implementation of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in 1989, which provides site-level data on emissions, this idea became a new paradigm in environmental regulation (Sunstein, 1999) and led Tietenberg (1998) to classify it as the third wave of environmental regulation, adding to the previously prevailing concepts of command and control and market-based instruments. As the rms' polluting behavior is generally unknown to the public, the obligation to disclose information aims at reducing information asymmetry in the market, thereby increasing eciency. In particular, the publication also addresses the gap between corporate reporting and stakeholder demands (Gouldson and Sullivan, 2007) .
The TRI is thought to be causal for a reduction in US-American emissions of 45 percent (Koehler and Spengler, 2007) . Moreover, Hamilton (1995) and Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) nd that capital markets show a signicant reaction to the TRI publications leading to the view that. (Konar and Cohen, 1997) nd that rms with large stock price decline subsequently reduced emissions and conclude that the TRI is an eective measure. As a consequence, today, this approach enjoys great popularity across the world. Also in Europe, a similar platform has been installed: On February 23, 2004, the rst data of the European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER) was released to the public. While most empirical studies focus on the US-American TRI, we provide one of the rst analyses of the eectiveness of transparency as a regulatory instrument in continental Europe. This is of particular interest, as the importance of environmental protection is much more present in the German society in the 21st century as opposed to its US-American counter- * This paper is part of the project INFINUM (informed citizens as an instrument of environmental regulation). We gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Ministry of Education and Research. We are grateful for inspiring discussions and helpful comments by Timo Goeschl and Stefan Pichler.
2 part in the late 1980s. In 1989, when the TRI was implemented, the environmental regulatory system was in an early stage of its development allowing the TRI to ll an important gap (Kraft, Stephen, and Abel, 2011) . In contrast to this, at the beginning of the 2000s, when the EPER was put into operation, the regulatory system was generally much more developed, particularly in Germany. According to the GDP per capita weighted Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI), Germany was ranked among the top ve high-income countries (GDP per capita ≥ $35,000) whereas the US occupied the bottom rung. Hence, our data allows us to answer the question, to what extent the provision of information remains a powerful regulatory tool in the context of a stronger regulatory framework. Does such a setting induce stronger reactions to the provided information (due to stronger preferences for a clean environment reected by the stronger regulation) or are market reactions weaker (as there is less value added in an already well-informed public)?
We base our analyses on the rst two EPER waves (2001 and 2004) . Applying an event study approach based on a Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM), we show that rms listed in the EPER loose market value in both years after the publication. We then run a large set of estimations to identify drivers of the observed devaluation. Our results show that market reactions can be explained by the reported emission levels if rms do not provide environmental reports -and when excluding carbon dioxide.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 describes the data set and provides the empirical specication as well as the research hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results of our analyses including some robustness checks. In Section 5 we discuss the conclude. The third wave is characterized by quasi-regulatory instruments. Tietenberg (1998) denes environmental disclosure strategies as public and/or private attempts to increase the availability of information on pollution to workers, consumers, shareholders and the public at large. This form of regulation tries to regulate through non-traditional players (e.g. the public opinion). Information disclosure strategies can substitute classic instruments of regulation as well as be used simultaneously.
In the absence of traditional regulation, information disclosure shall create market-based incentives for better ecological performance. Through these market forces the aected economic subjects shall self-regulate their pollution level in a way traditional regulation cannot achieve. According to Delgado-Ceballos, released one or more of the listed chemicals report periodically -usually annually -on the amount of released and/or transferred and to which environmental media.
Reported data are then made available to the public. On a more abstract level, the goals of PRTRs are the promotion of the right-to-know premise, the monitoring of environmental policy as well as the support of the reduction of emissions and risks (Kerret and Gray, 2007) . According to Tietenberg (1998) , there are four functions a PRTR has to incorporate. PRTRs shall help to detect environmental risks and collect reliable information about them. Furthermore, this information has to be disseminated to those who are exposed to the risks of the pollution. Additionally these private or public agents have to have the possibility to use the information to put pressure on the emitting subjects. Blackman, Afsah, and Ratunanda (2004) propose a fth element on the basis of their empirical analysis. This element is the information distribution to the polluter itself. This could create an audit eect and shed light on previously unknown room for improvement.
One important fact for the regulator is that information disclosure programs are generally thought to cost less than other regulatory instruments, especially since new information technologies (both hardware and software) facilitate the dissemination of environmental information. Furthermore, information disclosure programs serve an important social function -as they satisfy the right-to-know paradigm with respect to third-party pollution -making them politically more acceptable. As a consequence, in more and more countries information disclosure strategies are applied as environmental regulation.
US-American TRI
The best-known PRTR is the TRI, which was implemented in the USA at the end of the 1980s. The legal foundation of the TRI is the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) . The 1 However, one has to bear in mind, that the reduction of toxic releases is not connected with a reduction of the production of toxics, but instead with a development towards the recycling of these substances (Dasgupta, Wang, and Wheeler, 2006) . Therefore it cannot be concluded that a conversion to safer or less harmful toxics was realized. Nevertheless, the TRI is widely viewed as a success and has been copied throughout the world. Kerret and Gray (2007) compare emissions reductions after the implementation of the TRI in dierent commonwealth countries. They nd that in no other country such signicant and constant emission reductions could be realized as in the US.
According to Kerret and Gray, this can be explained by dierent characteristics as well as by diering prerequisites in the countries. However, we can think of an alternative explanation. The impact might also be reduced due to improved environmental regulation by the time the PRTRs were installed outside the US.
European Pollutant Emission Register
The basis for the public access to pollution registers in Europe is the European 
Previous research
Dierent studies have analyzed the reactions of the (nancial) market to the disclosure of environmental information. Most of them used data from the US.
The study of Hamilton (1995) represents the rst analysis of the eectiveness of environmental information disclosure as a regulatory instrument. 1989 -1994) . In their sample, abnormal returns are insignicant in the st reporting year (1987) and signicant in the subsequent years. Moreover, they nd that the decrease of environmental performance was followed by statistically signicant negative abnormal returns at the stock market. These abnormal negative returns also had an impact on the rms' behavior.
In a more recent contribution to the literature, Ferraro and Uchida (2007) analyze stock market reactions after the rst publication of the Japanese PRTR.
Withal they could not identify signicant negative abnormal returns, also when restricting to the top 50 polluters regarding total emissions. Hence, they reject the hypothesis of negative abnormal returns as a reaction to the publication of the Japanese PRTR. The authors explain the dierences as opposed to the TRI with a lack of media presence as well as the absence of public pressure, normally created by NGOs. It can be summarized that the success of the TRI is not easily transferable to other countries due to dierences in institutions, cultural norms and interests.
Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) analyze the effectiveness of the Spanish EPER. As in our paper, they use a MVRM to estimate the abnormal returns. According to their estimations, the information provided in the EPER has a signicant negative impact on the listed rm's market value.
Furthermore, they nd evidence that companies with higher emissions show also higher signicant negative abnormal returns. As explanation the authors suppose, 
Note.
Year reports the year in which the data was collected; year of data disclosure is given in parentheses.
Estimation window describes the interval at which the market model was calibrated.
Event window describes the interval or point in time for which abnormal returns were captured.
Points in time are given as days relative to the rst day of trading after the event occurred. that investors imply a lack of future competitiveness in contrast to companies with lower emissions. Table 1 summarizes the dierent event studies that analyze stock market reactions to the disclosure of emission registers.
3 Data and Empirical Specication
Identication of Abnormal Returns
We apply an event study to identify the inuence of environmental information on market value. This method has been established as the standard approach to capture market reactions to events or publications (Binder, 1998) . Identication rests on the assumption that stock price developments follow a market model.
Given this assumption, systematic deviations from the normal price development can be attributed to the event or information release occurring associated with this day (Brown and Warner, 1980) . Hamilton (1995) was one of the rst to stress that this method, which originally stems from the eld of nance, is also suitable to evaluate eectiveness of regulatory instruments.
Identication rests on the assumption of an ecient market in the sense of Fama (1970) .
3 Based on this assumption, share prices reect the current value of future cash ows. Moreover, the observed return at day t of share i (R it ) consists of an idiosyncratic part (α i ), a part that hinges on the average market return (R mt ) and a random error term with mean zero (u it ).
On the day of the event, we allow for abnormal returns that are captured by a dummy variable D 0t which takes the value of 1 on the day after publication of the information. According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) , the eect of the event can also aect days close to the event itself (while the applied time window should not be too large to avoid the inuence of disturbing eects). Hence, to allow information leaks on the day before as well as delayed information processing on the day after, we include two more dummies D −1t and D 1t that are set to 1 on the preceding and following day respectively. In doing so, the dummy variable captures any signicant deviation on the respective day. Put dierently, we extract the systematic component of u it to restore a zero mean error term. A large number of studies have been published based on this identication strategy. Most early studies used simple panel models with a rm independent dummy for abnormal returns (e.g. D 0 ), which is now known as the traditional approach. However, the method has been rened in the last years. In particular the work of Binder (1985) has helped to establish the Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM): To allow for heteroscedasticity across rms, the MVRM consists of n stacked equations, according to the number of rms in the sample, with rm specic dummy variables, yielding the following set of GLS equations:
3 There are also alternative models for stock prices, e.g. the capital asset pricing model.
However, the chosen market model is still the most commonly used approach (see e.g. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1998 ). Energy and water production and distribution EA 6 6 38 56
We choose the same estimation time window as in Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) , letting t run from 110 up to 10 trading days before the publication of the EPER. For market values of the emitting rms we use rm i's daily closing prices (P it ) at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Further, we use quotations of the German Stock Index (DAX) as measure for the average market performance. To get daily stock market returns on day t, we take dierences of the corresponding logged quotations.
We restrict the sample to those rms listed on a German stock exchange 5 , with 4 An alternative approach would be the calculation of the discrete return using R i t = 
Drivers of Abnormal Returns
In a second step we want to identify drivers of the observed market reaction. Therefore, we regress all signicant dummy coecients (γ ia ) on the observed emission levels and a set of additional regressors.
As our source of environmental information, we use data from the European 
where w s represents the relative toxicity of the polluting substance s, and e psi,y captures the emission of substance s on plant p for rm i in year y. Moreover, we believe that carbon dioxide (CO2) represents a special case of a pollutant. As 6 E.g., the threshold for CO2 emissions is 100,000,000 kg per year. As a consequence, the corresponding weight is 1/100,000,000. a consequence, we capture (similarly weighted) emissions of this substance in the variable CO2. We also control for size eects. As production levels are not reported in the German EPER, we use sales in year y (sales i,y ) as a proxy. The sales data is taken from the annual reports. When data was unavailable the respective rms were dropped. To allow for industry eects, we also include information on the rm's sector, captured by the NACE code which is reported in EPER (see Table   2 ). We include a sector dummy for all sectors with at least two rms.
Summarizing, our equation for abnormal returns after the publication of the rst wave of EPER data includes emissions levels (e i and CO i ), turnover level (sales i ), a dummy for environmental reports (ER) with interaction eects and a set of sector dummies (D s ).
The abnormal returns on day a in year y stem from the previous regression and are thus equal toγ ia,y . In this regression, identication requires the level of e i to be informative to the market. However, it is possible that the market reactions will include the expected value of e i in their former valuation of the rm. Hence, only the dierence between actual and expected emissions should be treated as news. We can test this hypothesis using emissions levels of 2001 as a proxy for expected emissions in 2004. Hence, we run the following regression where we take dierences of emissions and sales and keep the previous dummy variables to allow for sector time trends.
Research Hypotheses
The assumption of ecient capital markets leads to the hypothesis that new, unexpected information may cause abnormal changes in the stock prices (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll, 1969) . In addition to this, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argue that high pollutions of companies can be seen as ineciencies and therefore lead to a lack of innovation and competitiveness in the future -which is in turn reected in the current stock price of the rm. These processes were empirically veried for example by Hamilton (1995) . He points out, that the rst publication of the TRI data led to negative abnormal returns of the listed rms. Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) conrm this hypothesis for the Spanish data of the EPER. Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) examine additional to the rst publication following periods. They could verify that repeated disclosure of environmental information leads to signicant negative abnormal returns, although the reaction to the rst publication was not negative. Hence, we formulate the following rst hypothesis for the German data of the EPER:
H1. The publication of the EPER produces negative abnormal returns in the share price of listed rms.
Also, the pollution level has an inuence on the perception of the competitiveness of rms. As Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy (1998) as well as Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) argue, the higher the pollutions the lower is the stream of prots that a rm is expected to earn in the future, which is represented by the stock prices. Thus the costs of environmental liability for contamination caused by emissions are uncertain, because there is uncertainty about the occurrence of environmental damages of being held liable for those damages. Furthermore -de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008) show in their analysis of the EPER, that the negative abnormal returns are related to the relative level of rms`emissions. Ajar to this result, the second hypothesis H2 states:
Canon
H2. The rst publication of the EPER induces greater negative abnormal returns, the greater the level of (toxicity weighted) pollution.
As mentioned above Khanna, Quimio, and Bojilova (1998) 
Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated abnormal returns for the Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) as described in (2). As in Canon-de-Francia, Garcesayerbe, and Ramirez-Aleson (2008), we assign day 0 of the event to the rst day on which the information on the new EPER data appeared in the press: Feb 24, 2004 and Nov 24, 2006, respectively. 7 In particular, we present four dierent estimates for each year. First we estimated the abnormal returns on the three days of interest and, in addition to 7 Note that this notation slightly diers from the literature on the TRI, where day 0 marks the day of the publication of the data.
that, also test whether the cumulated abnormal returns are dierent from zero.
The results show signicant abnormal returns which makes us accept H1 for both waves. 
Robustness Checks
While most event studies just report a single estimation window -often without further justication -we oer an innovative robustness check. We systematically vary the window size and thus provide a much broader set of estimates. In Tables   7 and 8 in the appendix, we provide the p-values for estimation windows from 50 to 250 days before the event occurred. The picture strengthens the impression that the eect of the rst publication of EPER is less robust than the second publication which survives all window sizes. Moreover, it demonstrates the limitations of event studies, as for too small estimation windows, we get signicant coecients for nearly all days observed.
In a second robustness check, we studied a possible extension to the market model in (1), allowing the oil price to matter for stock market quotations. The results do not change substantially, the main results survive. Further, we reestimated equations (5) and (6) for each sector separately which also yielded similar results.
Conclusion
Our results provide new insights into the eects of the public provision of environmental information. In particular, we can present evidence that a pollutant release and transfers register still matters today -even in countries with high levels of environmental regulation. Further, our data show that carbon emissions are treated dierently by the stock market, suggesting that the installation of a market for emission allowances, like the EU-ETS for carbon, might crowd out public interest in the traded good. Moreover, we could show that environmental reports can serve as a substitute for the public register. If rms voluntarily provide such reports, changes in emission levels published in EPER can no longer explain abnormal returns. This suggests that the information provided in environmental reports was seen to be sucient by investors, thereby reducing the impact of the public register. In summary, however, EPER seems to be an eective instrument. In 2007, EPER was replaced by a new European register, E-PRTR, which provides yearly reports and covers an extended number of rms and pollutants, thereby oering further research opportunities.
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A Appendix: Robustness check data (-50,-10) 1.20e-08 4.48e-08 8.54e-09 .450891
(-60,-10) 2.02e-11 1.91e-12 1.13e-23 .6072292
(-70,-10) .0598362 .0145771 9.09e-11 .8909603 
